We examine the social desirability of ethanol production from agricultural crops when its effects on the greenhouse gas balance, land competition and crop prices are taken into account. The model comprises two land use forms: bioenergy crop and conventional feed crop. Industry demands crops for both ethanol and feed production. We characterize theoretically the private and social optima and apply the framework to barley production in Finland. In particular, we focus on various parts of the production chain and examine how the life cycle CO 2 -eq emissions associated in each part and the endogenous prices impact social benefits from ethanol production. We find ethanol production socially desirable under current ethanol price if, in addition to ethanol itself, it is possible to produce the side products: grain residue for animal feed, and the straw for energy. If either these side products cannot be produced, social returns to ethanol production either vanish or become very small. Moreover, we show that emissions from soil belong to critical key variables; if the existing uncertain proxies underestimate emissions from soil, social returns to ethanol production may vanish altogether. In all above cases, the outcomes result from changes in emissions offset, fertilizer intensity and land-use that are guided by endogenous crop prices.
INTRODUCTION
The European Union's Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) and the current renewable resource program have changed production incentives in favour of renewable energy production. The goal of renewable energy production is to reduce CO 2 -eq emissions and promote the production and use of bioenergy and biofuels. However, the net greenhouse gas (GHG) impacts of alternative biofuel production pathways remain disputable. It is possible that instead of net CO 2 -eq emission offsets, production and use of biofuels creates more CO 2 -eq emissions than the production and use of fossil fuels (Farrell et al. 2006 , Mäkinen et al. 2006 , Edwards et al. 2006 ).
The determination of life cycle GHG profiles of biofuel and fossil fuel production chains requires life cycle assessment (LCA). Most LCA studies have focused on the energy and GHG balances of biofuels and fossil fuels. These studies have demonstrated that in comparison to conventional fuels, biofuel pathways may provide GHG emission reductions (e.g. Mäkinen et al. 2006 , Edwards et al. 2006 ). However, as von Blottnitz and Curran (2007) observed in their review of ethanol production pathways, GHG emission reductions provided by different biofuel chains may vary significantly. This variation is mainly driven by differences in the treatment of co-products (protein meal from oilseed crops and feed from distiller grains) and how impacts are allocated to them. Also the quantity and type of process energy used has significant impact on the results. (Rajagopal & Zilberman 2007.) Accounting for the direct greenhouse gas balance of the whole life cycle is not enough, however. Changes in economic behavior must be accounted for, because these changes are reflected on the greenhouse gas balance as well. Promoting bioenergy and biofuel production leads to increased competition on agricultural land. Even if substituting biofuels for gasoline reduces direct GHG emissions and thus provides carbon benefits of using that land for biofuels, it is possible that their production involves indirect carbon costs through land use change (see e.g. Searchinger et al. 2008 ). Moreover, cropland diverted from feed and food production in Europe and the U.S. could provide strong incentives for taking additional land into cultivation of feed and food crops in other parts of the world (such as Brazil, China and India). This indirect land use change could lead to very high land-use change related emissions (Searchinger et al. 2008 ).
Ethanol can be produced from barley or wheat under existing cultivation methods. The higher the amount of land allocated outside of food and feed production, the higher the prices of cereals one can expect to be. OECD (2006 & 2008a) and Mitchell (2008) assessed bioenergy production and its impact on agricultural commodity prices. Prices, according to these studies, may rise 5-15% due to increased biofuel and bioenergy production.
As Rajagopal and Zilberman (2007) suggest, price changes of agricultural commodities depend on several regional factors, such as intensity of bioenergy crop cultivation and the extent of trade in food-related commodities. Furthermore, they point out that food industry may be negatively affected by the resulting higher input costs. However, socially optimal amount of biofuel production does not only depend on the price of cereals and on the effects of rising prices on different industries, but also on the climate impacts of biofuel production.
Thus, examination of social desirability of ethanol production must therefore be rooted in an analysis that endogenizes crop prices. Then, endogenous crop prices allow for the analysis of the trade-off between climate benefits from bioenergy crop production (either for heat and electricity or biofuel) and consumers' valuation of food and feed production.
In this paper we examine the social desirability of ethanol produced from agricultural crops.
To endogenize the competition on land use, we employ a Ricardian model of heterogeneous land quality, where land is allocated to alternative crops on the basis of their relative profitability. This land-use model captures nicely the fact that profits from crop cultivation depend on the land productivity as well as on the relative prices of alternative crops. The model comprises two land use types: bioenergy crop and conventional feed crop. Effects on the GHG balance are explicitly taken into account. To endogenize the bioenergy crop price we assume that industry demands the crop for both ethanol and feed production, and thus, competes on the crop. We apply the theoretical framework to ethanol produced from barley in Finnish agricultural conditions. 1 1 There is currently no ethanol industry in Finland. However, there are plans to open one or two ethanol plants, and our empirical section uses this information. While our study aims to provide insight into the social desirability of ethanol production in Finland, our approach itself is more general. Besides general theoretical analysis, we suggest here a systematic economic and LCA treatment of the whole production chain to reveal the key variables impacting ethanol production.
Our model integrates both the economic aspects as well as the climate impacts of agriculture and biofuel production. Integrating comprehensive GHG balances with consistent economic framework is vital in assessing the social desirability of biofuel production. Furthermore, agricultural production is described in detail in our model. This allows us to analyze the impacts of privately and socially optimal biofuel production on agriculture. This orientation is usually ignored in macroeconomic models of biofuel production. Finally, we make a major effort to trace out the key parts of the life cycle chain and economics variables that impact the desirability of biofuel production.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the theoretical framework and compare the privately and socially optimal solutions. Section 3 builds the parametric version of the model, presents the baseline results and examines key factors impacting the social returns to biofuel production. Concluding section 4 ends the paper.
ETHANOL PRODUCTION AND COMMODITY MARKETS: A FRAMEWORK

AND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we develop a framework to determine the private and social optimum for bioenergy crop production. We integrate the LCA aspects to conventional economic analysis.
We assume that bioenergy crop is used in the production of both biofuels and animal feed; thus, there is competition for bioenergy crop produced by farmers that will affect the endogenous price of bioenergy crop and alternative crop.
Privately optimal ethanol production
Ethanol and animal feed production
Consider an ethanol firm that manufactures animal feed and ethanol. Ethanol is the primary product and it is produced from bioenergy crop grains. These grains go first through ethanol production process. Production technology defines a concave production function ) ,
where h denotes bioenergy crop and e energy used in production process, with 0 > . Production process does not exhaust the grain inputs but the amount of residues (distiller grains) is used in a secondary production process to provide animal feed. We denote the amount of these residues by φ , which is a technical coefficient expressing the ratio of residues to input intensity of the primary process. The production of animal feed is described by a production function ) , ( e h a φ . This production process requires energy, which is denoted with e. Let P be the price of ethanol, R the price of animal feed, p H the price of bioenergy crop and the price of energy. Then, the profits of the ethanol firm is given by
The first order conditions from equation (1) are
Equations (2a) and (2b) describe the privately optimal ethanol production. The former implies that ethanol producer increases the production of ethanol to a point where the marginal revenue of using bioenergy crop in the production is equal with the marginal costs. The latter equation imposes the same condition for energy use. The factor demand of bioenergy crop can be implicitly derived from above equations and is given as ) , , , (
. The effects are intuitive.
In addition, a conventional animal feed producer manufactures animal feed with a production function ) (h y and profits
(3)
The first order condition from equation (3) is
From (4), the animal feed producer increases the production to the point where the marginal revenue of the production equals the marginal costs. The factor demand for bioenergy crop can be implicitly derived from the above condition and is expressed as ) , (
Agriculture
Let the total amount of arable land in the economy be G, which is assumed to be constant. This agricultural land is divided into parcels, production units. The land quality in each production unit is uniform but differs between production units. The quality depends on physical, chemical and biological factors, such as soil textural class, organic content, and soil acidity. It is assumed that the land quality can be ranked according to a scalar measure q. The scalar varies between zero and one, 1 0 ≤ ≤ q so that zero is the minimal and one maximal land quality. The cumulative distribution of q can be written as ) (q G and the density is ) (q δ which is assumed to be continuous and differentiable for analytical convenience:
Each production unit can be allocated to two different cereal crops, bioenergy crop and alternative crop. It is assumed that the alternative crop (crop W) is more profitable than the bioenergy crop (crop H) at higher quality parcels and more responsive to changes in land quality. The respective shares of land allocated to crops are denoted by W L and H L . The latter can be expressed as a function of W L , ) 1 (
The profit function of crop cultivation for crops i=H,W is for crops i= H,W is derived from the respective profit functions. Optimal fertilizer intensity is first chosen for both crops over all land qualities. Then each production unit is allocated to the crop which produces highest profits given land quality of the parcel.
The total profits from all production units can be defined as 2
The first order condition of equation (6) is
According to (7), the critical value of * q is defined by the equality of profits from both crops, Thus the market aggregate demand for bioenergy crop is 2 In the empirical application, the straw from bioenergy crop is assumed to replace peat in combined heat and power production following Mäkinen et al. (2006) . However, the production and use of straw is not included in the theoretical model. 
denote the aggregate climate impacts of ethanol production. Let D(Z) denote the damage function of climate impacts of ethanol production, with 0
The social planner maximizes social welfare defined as a sum of consumers' and producers' surpluses, comprising the sum of relevant market actors' net profits and the climate benefits and damages of ethanol production chain. The bioenergy crop production is used by the two
denote the (endogenous) share of production used in ethanol firm and (1-z) by the animal feed firm. Then
exhaust the production. We define the social welfare function as: 
Th e probl em of th e pl ann er i s to ch oose f erti li zer i n ten si ty f or b oth crops, th e use of bioenergy crop in both firms, use of energy input and land allocation between the three land use forms. This results in five simultaneous equations:
Equation (12a) is conventional; energy input is used up to the point where the value of marginal product equals the effective input price comprising also the climate impacts. From (12b), bioenergy crop yield is allocated between the two industries so that the value of its marginal product is the same from both of them, taking into account also the climate impacts associated with ethanol production. Equation (12c) characterizes the input use intensity for bioenergy crop in any parcel. Fertilizer intensity is increased to the point where its marginal contribution to the value of marginal product of bioenergy crop in both industries is equal to the sum of its input cost (comprising also the cost of CO 2 -eq emissions) and marginal climate impacts. The rest two are familiar from standard heterogeneous land quality models (see e.g.
Lichtenberg 2002). Equation (12d) defines input intensity for the alternative crop and (12e)
determine the land allocation between the two crops at critical land quality, where bioenergy crop becomes as profitable as alternative crop. In equation (12e), the net climate benefits are taken into account as well.
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION AND RESULTS
We next apply the theoretical framework to Finnish agriculture. Barley (crop H) is cultivated in whole country whereas the climate conditions restrict wheat (crop W) cultivation to the southern and western parts of Finland.
Parametric functions and greenhouse gas emissions
A Cobb-Douglas production function is calibrated for barley ethanol production in Finland.
Here we focus on the feedstock-to-ethanol conversion process in which following stages are taken into account: harvest of starchy parts of barley (straw/stalks used in combined heat and power production), feedstock conversion to sugar (including starch separation, milling, and conversion to sugars via enzyme application), process heat, sugar conversion to alcohol (including fermentation and distillation of alcohol), and co-products (distillers grains). The production function of ethanol is:
Parameter values for , and T are given in appendix 1. Furthermore, animal feed is produced from distiller grains. It is assumed that the production of animal feed depends linearly from the use of barley in the ethanol production process.
We use Mitscherlich specification of nitrogen response function for barley (i = H) and wheat (i = W) defined as:
Where m i , i and i are parameters and l i is nitrogen fertilizer intensity. The parameters of Mitscherlich response function have been estimated on the basis of Finnish field trials by Bäckman et al. (1997) . In order to calibrate the response function to actual yield levels corresponding to given nitrogen fertilizer use in Finland land quality is incorporated through parameter m i which is assumed to be linear in land quality, i.e. q m m m
The total amount of arable land is divided into 19 different land qualities. Each of these qualities is represented by a field parcel of one hectare. Parameters of Mitscherlich nitrogen response function, prices, cultivation costs and support payments are provided in appendix 1.
An exogenous constant elasticity functions are used to determine demand for wheat (alternative crop) and animal feed demand for barley. The function for wheat is expressed as
, where C W is shift parameter and W denote the elasticity of demand for wheat.
Animal feed demand for barley is expressed as
, where C H is shift parameter and H denote the elasticity of demand for barley.
We use greenhouse gas balance between conventional gasoline and ethanol as an indicator of climate impacts of production in the economy. Mäkinen et al. (2006) provide life cycle GHG emission estimates for biofuels used in transportation (see appendix 2). They estimated CO 2equivalent emissions for the whole chain from the production of inputs to the final use of bioenergy and biofuels. In this application, as presented in appendix 3, the following aspects are included in the agricultural phase: (i) CO 2 -eq emissions related to the transportation of crops, denoted with parameter (kg CO 2 -eq/kg crop); (ii) CO 2 -eq emissions related to the manufacturing, transportation and application of fertilizers, denoted with parameter (kg CO 2 -eq/kg nitrogen fertilizer); (iii) CO 2 -eq emissions from soil, tillage practices and harvest as well as pesticides and lime manufacturing, transportation and application, denoted with parameter (kg CO 2 -eq/hectare); and (iv) CO 2 -eq emissions from grain drying, denoted with parameter (kg CO 2 -eq/kg crop). Moreover, following Mäkinen et al. (2006) we assume that barley straw is used in combined heat and power production, where it replaces peat.
As regards ethanol conversion process we take the following aspects into account: (i) CO 2 -eq emissions from process energy and (ii) CO 2 -eq emissions from storage and distribution of ethanol. Furthermore, following Mäkinen et al. (2006) , we assume that distillers dried grain replaces imported soybean meal in feed production. As our focus is on climate policy, we consider ethanol to be carbon neutral. Thus, the end-use of ethanol does not increase the total amount of carbon in the atmosphere.
The valuation of climate impacts is incorporated into social welfare function through equation (11) . Parametric version of the equation (11) can be written as,
In equation (15), the CO 2 -eq emissions from wheat cultivation, , is defined as
and, in similar vein, the CO 2 -eq emissions from barley cultivation, is defined as
The value for , which represents the difference in GHG emissions between conventional gasoline production and use and ethanol production and use, is calculated from emissions presented in appendix 2.
Combining profit functions derived from equations (13) and (14) as well as parametric representation of climate impacts in equation (15) results in a parametric form of social welfare function.
The baseline scenario
We start reporting the market level results of the baseline in table 1. Ethanol production in the private optimum (68 702 tonnes) is higher than in the social optimum (66 413 tonnes); this is Thus, at the social optimum the equilibrium prices of wheat and barley become higher than in the private optimum (the price of barley is 1.36% and price of wheat is 2.12% higher in the social optimum). Therefore, barley input price is higher in the social optimum and ethanol production is lower in social optimum than in the private optimum.
Note finally that the ethanol demand is more price responsive than animal feed demand.
Consequently, ethanol demand for barley decreases 5.06% in social optimum whereas animal feed demand decreases only 0.14%. Turning to agricultural details of the two equilibria (table 2) , the social optimum favors wheat cultivation relative to the private optimum. In the private optimum, 10 out of 19 quality parcels are allocated to barley and rest to wheat, whereas in the social optimum the allocation is reversed. The socially optimal fertilizer intensity for both crops is lower than the privately optimal (8.23% for barley and 9.06% for wheat); this is because of the net life cycle climate impacts of fertilizer application. Consequently, the total amount of fertilizer application in agricultural production decreases 8.40% in the social optimum compared with private optimum. The average yield for both crops decrease in the social optimum due to the lower input use intensity. Finally, per hectare profits increase for both crops in the social optimum because the crop prices are higher and input intensities lower for both crops. There are no reductions in emissions from tillage practices, because they are the same for barley and wheat. However, the emissions from grain drying and transportation are 2.96% lower in the social optimum.
Finally, CO 2 -eq emission offstes are slightly lower in the social optimum because the total amount of ethanol produced in the social optimum is lower. Overall the total CO 2 -eq emissions are 3.56% lower in the social optimum than in the private optimum. Table 4 presents the welfare of market agents and climate impacts of biofuel production. In the empirical application the animal feed industry demand for barley is exogenous and thus it is not included in the profits. Profits from animal feed production dominate over the profits from ethanol production and, consequently, the total profits of ethanol industry are lower in social optimum than in the private optimum. Total profits from agriculture are lower in social optimum as well, however, profits from wheat cultivation increase in social optimum whereas profits from barley cultivation decrease. In total, the profits of all market agents decrease by 0.73%. Social benefits from ethanol production are 1.49% lower in social optimum than in private optimum because the amount of ethanol produced decreases in the social optimum. Social costs from agriculture, which represents climate damages from crop cultivation, decrease as well. The decrease is greater in barley cultivation (6.21%) than in wheat cultivation (1.07%). In total, the valuation of net climate impacts are 3.56% lower in social optimum than in private optimum. Consequently, the social welfare increases by 1.45%.
Key factors impacting social desirability of ethanol production
The baseline scenario was built on a set of assumptions concerning the production chain and associate life cycle impacts. We now turn to examine one by one the impacts of the most critical assumptions of the production chain, as well as the impact of ethanol price. We want especially to find the key factors that may question the desirability of ethanol production.
Impact of ethanol price
The baseline scenario uses the market price of ethanol in the EU. We now let ethanol price change (±20%). Lower ethanol price results in lower ethanol production and crop prices (table 5), and land is allocated from barley to wheat production. The total CO 2 -eq emissions are now lower thanks to lower fertilizer intensity. However, now the CO 2 -eq emission offsets decrease as well. The effect of a lower ethanol price on private profits is drastic: ethanol production itself becomes unprofitable; industry makes profit only if it produces animal feed from distillers' dried grains with solubles (DDGS) (see appendix 4). Farmers are worse-off due to lowered profits from both barley and wheat cultivation. The social welfare is lowered by almost 90%. (For a 20% increase in ethanol price, just the opposite happens, more ethanol is produced, crops prices are higher and more land is allocated to barley and total emissions increase, and social welfare more than doubles, see appendix 4).
Role of soil CO 2 -eq emissions
The emissions from soil are highly uncertain and difficult to measure. Moreover, they depend on spatial aspects as well as soil texture and composition. Thus, we let the soil CO 2 -eq to vary by 20%. We report the results for higher emissions in table 5 (see appendix 4 for more details and the case where emissions from soil are 20% lower than estimated and the case for ethanol becomes much stronger). We find that in the private optimum, the prices, production, and profits remain unchanged, because no climate impacts are considered there. Moreover, the respective changes in the social optimum are marginal.
If the CO 2 -eq emissions from soil are higher than in the baseline, total emissions become roughly 14% higher in private and social optima. Moreover, there are no longer climate benefits from ethanol production; the climate policy basis for biofuel promotion programs has vanished. Thus, the uncertainty of estimated soil emissions has important implications on social desirability of ethanol production. Furthermore, the emissions from soil can, in fact, be much higher than presented in this alternative scenario, which would probably imply even greater climate damages from ethanol production. The impact of CO 2 -eq emission offsets from straw
The baseline assumed that barley straw is used in the combined heat and power production to generate CO 2 -eq emission offsets. This hardly is possible at a larger scale in the economy.
Results for the case of CO 2 -eq emission offsets from straw use are presented in table 6. In the private optimum, prices, production and profits remain the same in the baseline. The great difference relative to the baseline is in the emission offsets. They vanish altogether and net emissions are produced.
Hence, if barley straw is not used in energy production, ethanol production is not socially desirable, as it causes climate damages. Private profits are still positive, and this keeps the production still going on but at much lower level than in the baseline. This has the obvious implication for crop prices and land allocation.
The role of animal feed production from DDGS
We examine next the role of animal feed production for desirability of ethanol production.
When animal feed production is not feasible, the ethanol industry sells only ethanol and the CO 2 -eq emission offsets from DDGS replacing imported soybean meal vanish. The results differ radically from the baseline scenario (table 6) . Ethanol production is almost 50% and crops prices over 40% lower than in the baseline and more land is allocated to wheat. The total CO 2 -eq emissions decrease due to reduced fertilizer application, even though there are no CO 2 -eq emission offsets from ethanol production. As offsets from DDGS are absent, ethanol production causes more emission than it offsets. In the absence of animal feed production from DDGS, the total profits of the ethanol industry and agriculture negative.
Furthermore, social valuation of ethanol production is now negative making the social welfare negative as well. Thus, with no animal feed production from DDGS, mitigation of climate change does not support ethanol production from barley in Finland.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We examined the social desirability of ethanol production from agricultural crops in market equilibrium model with endogenous land use between bioenergy crop and conventional feed crop that are demanded by ethanol and feed industry. Drawing on the GHG balance, we particularly examine the key factors of social desirability of biofuel production.
Starting with price impacts, our baseline scenario results show that the socially optimal demand for barley is 1.92% lower than demand obtained in the private optimum. Even though the use of ethanol as transportation fuel offsets some CO 2 -eq emissions relative to conventional gasoline production and use, the optimal ethanol production is 3.68% lower in social optimum than in private optimum. This is due to the fact that the social costs of CO 2 -eq emissions in agriculture are greater than the social benefits obtained from ethanol production and use. Thus, it is socially favorable to reduce the input use intensity in agriculture even though this reduces the supply of barley and, consequently, the amount of ethanol produced.
Our results show that in the baseline scenario, producing socially optimal amount of ethanol increases the price of barley by 1.44% and price of wheat by 2.20%. This impact is small, much less than, for instance, the recent price changes of agricultural markets in 2007-2008 in agricultural markets (in Finland 75% for wheat and over 65% for barley). Previous studies (e.g. OECD 2006 , 2008a & 2008b , Mitchell 2008 ) predicted that crop prices would increase 5-15% due to increased production of biofuels. However, in our baseline scenario, the crop prices increase merely, because the social costs in agriculture are taken in account, not because the production of biofuels increase. Actually, the amount of biofuel produced in the social optimum is lower than in private optimum and barley demand for ethanol is lower as well. This suggests that greenhouse gas mitigation is a questionable argument for promoting ethanol production when the life cycle impacts of the whole production chain are carefully accounted for.
The results of our baseline scenario depend highly on the definition of the production chain of ethanol. In more detail, the assumptions made on the CO 2 -eq emissions of barley cultivation have a considerable impact on the results. Moreover, the changes in relative prices of inputs and outputs have an impact on the results as well. Sensitivity analysis shows that a 20% lower ethanol price makes ethanol production unprofitable. Consequently, the profitability of ethanol industry would depend only on the production of animal feed from DDGS.
Furthermore, lower ethanol price would decrease the total social welfare considerably.
Uncertainties of CO 2 -eq emissions from soil are large. If the soil related CO 2 -eq emissions are 20% higher than in our baseline scenario, there are no climate benefits from ethanol production. Again, we are in a situation, where ethanol production creates more CO 2 -eq emissions than the use of ethanol offsets in transportation. Thus, it would be crucial to get accurate data on soil-related emissions to be able to analyze the social desirability of ethanol prodcution. Furthermore, if straw does not replace peat in combined heat and power production, which was a key assumption of baseline, there are no CO 2 -eq emission offsets in energy production. Consequently, ethanol production would not create CO 2 -eq emission offsets, but net emissions. Finally, if it would not be possible to produce animal feed from residues of ethanol production process, both the profits from agriculture and the total social welfare are negative. Thus, ethanol production would only be socially desireable if the residues of production process are further processed to animal feed.
The findings of this paper have a larger bearing. We demonstrated that accounting for just the direct life cycle effects or just the price effects of ethanol production is not enough. Joining them in an integrated analysis is the right approach to assessing the social desirablity of biofuel production. We observed that in the baseline and alternative scenarios ethanol production was lower in social optimum than in private optimum. This calls for a modification of biofuel programs on environmental grounds; many key variables may even argue against any biofuel policies. Thus, mitigating climate change with production of ethanol does not seem especially viable policy option. As recently emphasized, reserving arable land for food production may be in a longer term much wiser option in the face of expected food crisis. 
Appendix 1 Parameter values in the empirical application
Appendix 2 Greenhouse gas emissions from ethanol production chain and reference fuel
Emissions Value ETHANOL PRODUCTION Production and use of nitrogen fertilizer* 10.715 kg CO 2 -eq / kg N Soil* 1 430 kg CO 2 -eq / ha / a Pesticides production and use* 16.7 kg CO 2 -eq / kg pesticides Tillage practices (and lime)* 251.38 kg CO 2 -eq / ha Transportation* 0.05881 kg CO 2 -eq / ton / km Grain drying* 0.06561 kg CO 2 -eq / kg Ethanol production, storage and distribution* 0.035 kg CO 2 -eq / MJ End-use of ethanol 0 kg CO 2 -eq -CO 2 -eq.
-CO 2 -eq.
-CO 2 from soil -CO 2 -eq. from fertilization -CO 2 -eq. from tillage practices, harvesting and grain drying Ethanol production -CO2-eq from process energy 
